Winnetta J. Llewelyn v. The Industrial Commission of Utah, Clayton Investment Company, and United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1948
Winnetta J. Llewelyn v. The Industrial Commission
of Utah, Clayton Investment Company, and United
States Fidelity and Guaranty Company
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Earl, Groth and Robert Spooner; Skeen, Thurman and Worsley; Attorneys for Defendants; Grover
A. Giles; Attorney General of Utah;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Llewelyn v. Industrial Commission of Utah et al, No. 7166 (Utah Supreme Court, 1948).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/847
Case No. 7166 
In the Supreme Comt 
of the State of Utah 
WINNETTA J. LLEWELYN, widow 
of Isaiah J. Llewelyn, deceased, 
Plaintiff and Appella;nt, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMIS·SION 
-OF-UTAH, CLAYT·ON INVE-ST-
MENT COMPANY, and UNITED 
STATES FIDELTIY AND GUAR-
ANTY _COMPANY, 
Defenda!nts <UrU1 Respondern.ts. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS 
T1 !i :; ~-!!' ____ OT.H. and_ ROBERT SPOONER, 
_l(i · · 1 f, .EE . , · " URMAN and WORSLEY, 
· ·-""- , · ~/ -~--? Att · s for Defe~ts . 
AUG 2 0 1~yton Investment Company and United 
·-. · States. Fidelity and Guaranty ~Company 
~ ..... -------.------- --- --------- . 
ClERK, SUPRE:.:~ <&BOVE!t A. GILE·S, 
.Attorney General of Utah 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
Page 
ARGUMENT ---------------------------------------------------- ------··-·-·-·····--····--·---------------2-24 
STA.TEMENT OF FACTS ------------------------------------------------------------------------1-18 
CASES CITED 
Binkley vs. Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation, 
40 A. ( 2d) 132 ('Pa. 1944) ----------------··········-······----------------------------------- 15 
Diaz vs. Industrial Commission, 80 Utah 77, 13 P. ( 2d) 307 ---·---------- 12 
Dupree vs. Monroe Sand & Gravel Co., 18 So. (2'd) 845·, 
(La. 1943) -------------------------------------- _______ --------------------------------------........... 15 
Geo. A. Lowe Co. vs. Industrial ·Commission, 56 Utah 519, 
190 Pac. 934............................................................................................ 4 
Kent vs. Industrial Commission, 89 Utah 381, ·57 P. (2d) 72:4............ 3 
McGarry vs. Industrial Commission, 63 Utah 81, 2.22 Pac. 592, 
(1923); and on rehearing, 64 Utah 592, 232 Pac. 1090 (192:5) .... - 10 
Merrill vs. Panasco Lumber Co., 204 Pac. 72 ·(N.M. 19!22) .................. 14 
Urban vs. Nanticoke City, 169 Atl. 466, (Pa. 1933) .... -------------------------- 14 
Utah Apex Mining Co. vs. Industrial·Commission, 64 Utah 221, 
228 Pac. 1078 (1924) ----------------------------------------------·-··--------------------------8-10 
Utah Apex Mining Co. vs. Industrial Commission, 
66 U tab 529, 244 Pac. 656 ( 1926) -----------------------------------------------··---5-10 
Utah Fuel·Co. vs. Industrial Commission, 
80 Utah 301, 15 P. (2d) 297 .. --------------------------------------------------------·-·- 11 
Woodburn vs. Industrial Commission, 181 P. (2d) 209, 
(Utah - 194 7) ········----------------·----------------------------------------------------------------· 3 
STATUTES 
42-1-67, U .'C.A .. 1943 .... --------------------------------------------------------------------···-----·-·--· ,5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
WINNETTA J. LLEWELYN, widow 
of Isaiah J. Llewelyn, deceased, 
Plaintiff 0/nd A.pp~elZan.t, 
vs. 
THE IND·USTRrAL ·CO·MMIS;SION 
OF UTAH, CTJAYTON INVE·ST-
MENT COMPANY, and UNi'TED 
·STATES FIDELITY AN·D GUAR-
ANTY ·COMPANY 
' 
Deferulants ami/, Respondernts. 
Case No. 
7166 
BRIE·F OF DEFE'ND·ANT~S AND RIDSPONDENTIS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
(All italics, unless otherwise noted, are defendants') 
It is deemed advisable to amplify, to a limited ex- . 
tent, the statement of facts relative to dependency set 
forth in plaintiff's brief. 
The plaintiff obtained a . decree of separate main-
tenance from the deceased in 193!6 which ordered de-
ceased to pay $·25.00 per month to plaintiff. The further 
details of that decree are not in evidence, and there is 
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2 
nothing in the record to support the statement that the 
decree contained a finding that the plaintiff in 19:36 was 
dependent upon deceased, although th·e matter is not 
properly relevant to this proceeding in any event. After 
the decree in 1936, plaintiff and deceased no longer lived 
together, and were not living together at the time of his 
death on March 27, 1947. 
During the five years preceding death, plaintiff re-
ceived no money of any kind from .deceased, (Tr. 78), 
and during the six previous years received $200 or $22·5, 
which was all the money received during the period of 
separation CTr. 78). After the separation in 19·36, plain-
tiff maintained a home and worked off· and on during 
that time· in War Plants, laundries and other places at 
a salary apparently averaging about $7·5 per month (Tr. 
77) .. 1The oldest son was in the· service, but during that 
time he made no allotment because, as plaintiff stated, 
('Tr. 7·9) "I was in War Work and didn't need it." 
After returning from the service in 1944, that son pur-
chased groceries for the house (Tr. 79) and claimant 
lived with him thereafter (Tr. 80). The daughters from 
time to time bought groceries and things of that typ·e 
('Tr. 79)'. 
ARGUMENT 
The sole question p,resented by plaintiff's brief is 
as to whether or not plaintiff was a ''dependent'' of the 
deceased workman, Isaiah J. Llewelyn, a:t the time of his 
death. We believe there is another question which merits 
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3 
consideration, and that is as to whether or not the death 
'v-as caused by injuries arising out of the course of em-
ployment, but for purposes of clarity that matter will be 
argued at a later point in this brief. 
It is noted that the Industrial Commission (Tr. 12.) 
found that plaintiff 'vas not dependent upon deceased at 
the time of his accidental injury and death, and it is 
deemed advisable at the outset to briefly analyze the 
extent and nature of any review that may be made by 
the Supreme Court.on that finding. 
In Kent vs. Industrial .Commission, 89 Utah 381, 
57 P. 2d 724 (1936), the court stated at page 725: 
''In the case of denial of compensation, the 
record must disclose that there is material, sub-
stantial, competent, uncontradicted evidence suffi-
cient to make a disregard of it justify the con-
clusion, as a matter of law, that the Industrial 
Commission arbitrarily and cap-riciously disre-
garded the evidence or unreasonably refused to 
believe such evidence. See Kavalinakis v. Ind. 
Commission, 67 Utah 174, 246 P. ·698, and Gagos 
v. Industrial Commission (Utah), 48 P. (2d) 449, 
450." 
That this rule is well settled is apparent in the 
recent case of Woodburn vs. Industrial Commission, 181 
P. 2d 209 (Utah-19·47), wherein the court cited with 
appiroval the Kent case, supra, and also stated at page 
212: 
''In Lorange v. Industrial ·Commission, 107 
Utah 261, 153 P. 2'd 272, 273, we quoted with 
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approval from Kavalinakis v. Industrial Com-
mission, 67 Utah '174, 2'46 P. 698, as follows: 
'Unless therefore it can he said, upon 
the whole record, that the commission 
clearly acted arbitrarily or capriciously in 
making its findings and decision, this court 
is powerless to interfere .... It was not 
in tended, . . . that this court, in matters 
of evidence, should to any extent substitute 
its judgment for the judgment of the com-
mission.' '' 
It is also noted that dependency in the type of case 
here involved has been held to be a question of fact to 
be determined by the commission, not the reviewing 
court. ·See Geo. A. Lowe ·Co. vs. Industrial ~Commission, 
56 Utah '519, 190 Pac. 9"34 (1920). 
The applicable rules of law by which dependency 
in & case of this kind may 'be determined have, been stated 
many times by this court. There is but one standard, 
and that is as to whether or not the alleged dependent 
has a reasonable expeetation of continuing or future sup-
port and maintenance. In· determining the ''reasonable 
expectation'' there are, of course, a number of factors 
to be given consideration, among which are the legal 
obligation to support, pas~ contributions, action in anti-
cipation of future contributions, and whether or not 
applicant has means of support in substitution for the 
anticipated contributions of deceased. O:f all of these 
factors, logic and common sense would indicate that by 
far the strongest and most controlling is the re·cord of 
past contribution. We cannot agree with the theory 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
advanced by plaintiff's brief that there are two criteria, 
"reasonable expectation'' and "need plus legal duty", 
since the cases clearly indicate that need and legal duty 
are merely t""'"o of several factors which must be con-
sidered in determining reasonable expectation. 
Applicable provisions from the controlling statute, 
42-1-67 U.C.A. 194'3, read as follows: 
''The following persons shall be p,resumed to be 
wholly dependent for support upon a deceased employee: 
(1) A wife upon a husband with whom she lives 
at the time of his death. 
• • • • 
In all other cases, the question of depen-
dency, in whole or in part, shall be determined 
in accordance with the facts in each p·articular 
case existing at the time of the injury resulting 
in the death of such employee .... '' 
Since in the instant case plaintiff had not lived with 
deceased for eleven years, and was not living with him 
at time of death, subsection (1) is not ap·plicable, and 
the case is controlled by the second quoted portion of 
the statute. 
'The standard by which dependency should be deter-
mined was laid down in the 1926 case of Utah Apex 
Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission, 6·6 Utah 529', 244 
Pac. 656. There applicant wife and deceased husband 
were married at Blackfoot, Idaho, in 19'18, and after in-
termittently living together for several months, she went 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
to her brother at Pocatello and worked at odd jobs until 
192'2 when she went to her mother at Morehead, Kansas. 
She remained there for about two years, supp;orting her-
self by canvassing, and returned to Price, Utah in 1924, 
continuing to support herself in the same manner up to 
her husband's death on May 12, 192~4, which death was 
occasioned by a.n accident while employed by the Utah 
Apex Mining Company. :she received no money from her 
husband during most of this period, but did keep track 
of him and stated that she would have gone back to live 
with him and demanded his sup·port if he had been work-
ing. 'The order awarding comp·ensation was reversed 
upon appeal. 
'The court stated, p1age 657: 
'' * * * And the burden of establishing de-
pendency was upon the applicant. Utah Apex 
Min. 'Co. vs. Ind. ·Com., 2·28 Pac. 1078, 64 Utah 
22'1. It is. plainly deducible from the statute itself 
that dependency is not presumed from or estab-
lished by the existence of the legal relation of 
the wife to the husband, unless they are living 
together, and when, as in this case, they were 
not living together, dependency is not established 
unless something tending to show dependency, 
in addition to the legal duty of the husband, is 
shown. 
''In 28 R.'C.L. 771, it is said: 
" 'The pur:pos,e of the: st1atute is to P''novide 
the workman~s dep~en:went in future wit!h som.e-
thitng iJn substitution for, wh1at has been lost by 
the workman's de1at:h, and, consequently to estab-
lish dependency the a·p;plicant for compensation 
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n1ust sho'v that he or she had reasonable grounds 
to anticipate future support from the decedent. 
This reasonable expectation of continuing or fu-
ture support and 1naintenance seems to be the 
true criterion as to who are dependents.' 
'·And, at page 773: 
" 'If the applicant for compensation is un-
aided by the statutory presumption of depen-
dency, he must present proof of the fact. Among 
the principal indicia of the state of dependency 
may be mentioned the legal obligation of support; 
the fact that contributions have been made in the 
past; the fact that the applicant has taken some 
action in anticipation of future contributions, and 
the fact that the applicant has no means of sup-
po~ in su'bstitution for the anticipated contribu-
tions of the deceased. It is not to he understood, 
of course, that all of these elements must be 
proven in any p~articular case; but it will he true 
in a great majority of cases, though there will be 
well defined exceptions, that contribution in the 
past is an essential, as it is the most cogent, evi-
dentiary fact in the proof of dep·endency. The 
legal obligation of support, when considered 
alone, will rarely, if ever, establish a state of 
dependency, or give rise to a presumption that a 
person is a dep·endent; but it may very well 
strengthen a weak inference arising from small or 
irregular contributions, or it may aid a promise of 
future support. Where it appears that the legal 
obligation had been neglected by the deceased im-
mediately prior to his death, the issue of depen-
dency must be resolved ordinarily with reference 
to the duration of the period of non-support.' 
''In cases where the employee upon whom the 
legal duty of support rests has deserted his de-
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pendents, and has wrongfully evaded or neglected 
his obligation to them, it is a proper inquiry whe-
ther the facts and circumst·ances warrant the 
reasonable p:robability that the legal obligation 
would have been enforced in future. And it can 
easily be supposed that when such reasonable 
probability exists, a state of dependency, under 
the statute, might be found. 
"In the case at bar, to establish her depen-
dency upon deceased, it was incumbent upon the 
applicant to show not only that deceased owed 
her that legal duty of sup-port, but that there was 
a reasonable expectation that the duty would be 
fulfilled; in o:thJer words, that the legal iobliga-
t~on of support must b.e c·owrplle~d wit:h suc'h othe.r 
facts 1amd circumstamces as vo: w1a~t the ·reas~ovn.­
able probability that such obligatWovn would be 
p·erfo·rmed. '' 
In the earlier case of Utah-Apex Mining Co. vs. 
Industrial Commission, 64 Utah 221, 228 Pac. 1078 (1924)' 
the evidence showed that the de-ceased husband had left 
his wife ·and failed to support her from D·ecemher 1918 
until October, 1923, when the accident occurred which 
caused his death. ·The ·claimant Wife not only had re-
ceived no ~unds during this time· from deceased, but was 
in necessitous circumstances and receiving alms. from 
the county poor fund. The commission's award based 
upon a finding of dependency was annulled upon the 
ground that no dependency existed. 
·The court at page 1080, went to considerable length 
to discuss the matter of the financial condition of the 
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claimant and to point out that it has little if any bear-
ing on the question of dependency: 
"'In Honnold, Workmen's Comp. vol. 1, See. 
· 70, p. 224, the author, discussing the question as 
to who are dependents, says: 
'It may be said in general terms that 
a ''dependent'' is one who looks to another 
for support, one depen9-ent upon another 
for the ordinary necessities of life for a 
person of his class and· position.' 
''Further on, in the same section, at page 
225, the author continues: 
'It follows that dependency does not 
depend on whether the alleged dependents 
could support themselves without dece-
dent's earnings, or so reduce their ex-
penses that they would be supported in-
dependent of his earnings, but on whether 
they were in fact supported in whole or 
in part by such earnings under circum-
stances indicating an intent on the part 
of the deceased to furnish such support.' 
"In Dosker's Manual of ·Compensation Law, 
at page 19·4, the author, quoting from a Connecti-· 
cut ease, says : 
'A dependent under the act is not nec-
essarily one to whom the contributions of 
the injured or deceased workman are nec-
essary to his or her support. The test is 
whether the contributions were relied upon 
by the dependent for his or her means of 
living.' '' 
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Plaintiff has cited in support of his position the 
case of McGarry vs. Industrial ·Commission, ·63 Utah 
811, 222 Pac. 592 (192'3), and 6'4 Utah 592, ·2~3.2, Pac. 1090 
(192:5). The case is readily distinguishable since it in-
volved a deserted infant seven years old, and the c·o'Yir 
cealment. by the deceased father of his whereabouts, 
coupled with an actual dependency. This court in the 
Utah-Apex Mining ·Co. case of 192'4, supra, distinguished 
the facts of the first McGarry decision in the opinion, 
and ·pointed out the unusual features of the McGarry 
case. Also in the Utah-Apex Mining Case of 19216, supra, 
the court again commented on the McGarry case as fol-
lo,vs, page H59, Pacific Reporter: 
''In this state of facts we are compelled to 
conclude that there was no proof, aside from the 
legal obligation of deceased, upon which to base 
the conclusion that there was a reasonable expec-
tation of future sup,port by the deceased. ·This 
conclusion is not opposed to what was said or de-
cided in McGarry v. Ind. Com., which was twice 
before this court. 22.2 P. 592, H3 Utah, 81; 2'32 
P. 1090, ·6'4 Utah, '592, 3.9 A.L.R. 306. 'That case 
involved the claim of a minor child, seven years 
of age, whose father had deserted it, and left for 
parts unknown, and concealed his whereabouts 
and identity for two or three years and until his 
death. This court decided that it was further 
shown that the ·child was actually dependent; that 
the peculiar and exceptional circumstances pres-
ent would support a finding that the: child was a 
dependent of its father, within the meaning of 
the statute. The lactwal mBp'endency of the child, 
its lack of leg,al c.a.p,acity to ass.ert or waive its 
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11 
legal ,right tto suppor.t front its fa.th.er, and the 
conduct of the father in concealing himself to 
avoid his legal duty are features which clearly 
distinguish that case from the one under review. 
In Utah -4:\.pex l\1in. Co. v. Ind. Com., 228 P. 1078, 
6-! Utah, 221, the clahn of a vvife to be adjudged 
a dependent ''Tas denied. The parties had lived 
apart for four years, during which time the hus-
band had made no contributions to his wife's sup-
port. She testified that her husband had left her, 
and that she did not expect him to come back or 
to support her or furnish her with any financial 
assistance. In each of lhe oases last Cl~tie:d t'hte.re 
was present the leg,al obligat~ion of su.pv1ovr:t, arnd 
the ultimate test in ieach case w·as the p1"obability 
of futur,e support.'' 
Plaintiff has also cited the case of Utah Fuel C:om-
pany vs. Industrial Commission, 80 Utah 301, 15 P. ('2·nd) 
297 (19'32), and quotes from that opinion relative to the 
basis for dependency ·as being established solely upon a 
need plus a legal duty. The case does not involve the 
dependency of a wife legally separated from her hus-
band, but minor children. Adherence to the rule of the 
previous Utah decisions was contained in the statement 
of the court at page 2·98 as follows: 
''The decisions of the courts in this country 
and in England are practically un-animous in hold-
ing in cases where dependency rests on facts, not 
presumption, that a finding of dependency can-
not rest alone on proof of relationshipi of the· 
parties, but that, in addition thereto, there must 
be introduced in evidence some facts showing 
that the right to support has some practical value. 
The minimum requirement ·is that there must be 
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shown a r.ea.sonable p't1ob,abilit:y t'hat the ob~igation 
of the parent will be fulfilled. Glaze v. Hart, 2·25 
Mo. App. 1205, 3'6 ·S.W. '(2d) '684; ·Oeean Accident 
& Guarantee ·Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 32 
Ariz. 54, 255 P. 598 ; Id., 34 Ariz. 17'5, 269 P. 77 ; 
Young v. Niddrie & Benhar Coal Co., Ltd., 603 
B.W.C.C. 744. :see cases cited in ·McGarry v. In-
dustrial ~Commission, 63 Utah 81, ·2:22 P. :592; Id., 
·64 Utah 592, 23.2 P. 1090, 39 A.L·.R. 306. ·The rule 
is state.d by Mr. Justice Cherry in Utah-Apex 
Mining ·Company v. Industrial Commission, 66 
Utah '529, 244 ·P. 656-, S:57, as follows: 'In cases 
where the employee upon whom the legal duty 
of support rests has deserted his dependents, and 
has wrongfully evaded or neglected his obligation 
to them, it is a proper inquiry whether the facts 
and circumstances warrant the reasonable ·prob-
ability that the legal obligation would have been 
·enforced in future. ..A. nd it cW'n easily b·e swpvpiO'S'ed 
that w·hen svuch reasonable vp'roba:bility lexists, a 
state of dependency, under the statute, might be 
found.''' 
The ease of Diaz vs. Industrial !Commission, 80 Utah 
7'7, 13 P. '('2.nd) 307 (1932) from which the plaintiff quotes 
at length has no relevancy to the facts of the case before 
the Commission. ~The ·court itself summarized the evi-
dence to point out this distinction, at page ·312: 
''Here the parties lived together for ·eleven 
years, during all of which time the ap·plicants 
looked to the deceased for sup·port and main-
tenance, and were supported and maintained by 
him. When the deceased left Dividend and went 
to Butte, there is no substantial com·petent evi-
dence to show nor to justify an inference tha.t 
such family relation was not to continue or that 
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by mutual consent it "\Vas so changed that the de-
ceased no longer was required to perform his legal 
and moral obligation to support the applicants, 
or that they no longer 'vere to be supported by 
him, or no longer expected to receive sup·port 
from him, and that they from thence on were 
required to shift for themselves without aid from 
the dHceased. We do not see anything in the 
record to justify ·any such inference or conclu-
sion. None such is justified, because the parties 
lived apart from each other for about a year and 
a half, about one year of which the deceased was 
in Butte. Further, the evidence shows that dur-
ing the time he was in Butte he and his wife· cor-
responded with each other, and that she received 
moneys from him, and, when he returned to Divi-
dend, they visited each other, and on such occa-
sions he also gave her money for the sup~port of 
herself and of the minor child.'' 
No other logical conclusion could he drawn from that 
evidence, but that there was a distinct probability of 
support and maintenance, and the court very carefully 
pointed out the contributions and close relationship· of 
the parties which made this so. The mere fact that hy 
a mutual arrangement of the parties there is. at the in-
stant of death a temporary separation with no active 
support should not deny compensation and a finding of 
dependency in and of itself. A husband may have left 
his family to establish a home elsewhere, as the court 
indicates, yet they may be dependent u·pon him. Why~ 
Because under such circumstances they may antieip·ate 
the probability of future support. The very quotation 
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14 
from page 311 set forth by. plaintiff, citing from a Penn-
sylvania case, makes this clear. 
'' ... Where the separation is merely for the 
mutual convenience of the parties, and the wife 
is dependent, and the obligation to support her 
is either recognized or performed, the mere fact 
that the husband, for any reason, fails to perform 
that duty for a time, does not deprive the wife of 
her status as a de-pendent .... '' 
The decision also cites the case of Merrill vs. Penasco 
Lumber Co., 204 Pac. 72 ('1922), and plaintiff cites this 
case in her brief. It is the same type of :case as the Diaz 
case, and falls within an entirely distinct category than 
that with which we are here concerned. These cases do 
not in any sense modify the rule established that the 
true criterion of dependency, absent statutory presump-
tion, is the reasonable probability of future support. 
In general, it is 'believed that the Utah decisions 
provide adequate authority for the proper determination 
of the question of dependency. It is deemed advisable, 
however, to comment briefly on the Pennsylvania deci-
sions in plaintiff's brief, since they have been cited. Th~ 
case Urban v. Nanticoke ·city, 169 Atl. 46'6 (Pa. 19133), 
is clearly distinguishable. There the wife had been con-
fined to a mental hospital, supported by public authori-
ties, for many years, and while no actual payment had 
been made for the eleven years prior to death, the deci-
sion very carefully pointed out that the wife had been 
paroled to her husband for varying periods during her 
overall st·ay in the ho·spital, that he visited his wife on 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
holidays during the period, that he had p,romised to pay 
the public authorities on several occasions when he· h·ad 
funds to do so, and that he had promised to take care 
of his 'vife whenever she was released. In view of these 
factors, the court viewed dependency as established. 
In Binkley vs. ~Stone & Webster Engineering ,c·or-
poration, 40 ·A. 2d 1'32 '(Pa. 1944) the distinguishing fac-
tor, and the core of the decision, was stated ·at :page 134: 
'''The conclusion of the board was: 'Under 
the circumstances, she did all she could reason-
ably be expected to do. Her failure to receive 
payments on the support order was due to de-
cedent's evasion of his obligation and the inten-
tional ooncealment of his where-abouts. Wie· can 
presume that har!J cZaimaJnt known where her hus-
band was employed legal p~r.ocess W'ovuld Jvave ·p~no­
duced oompliance w·ith the order .r1md payme?Vt of 
mo"Y/Je·y to claimam.t.' '' 
There is no factor of concealment whatsoever in the 
case before the court. 
In Dupree vs. Monroe ·Sand & Gravel Co., 18 So. 
2d 845 ('La. 19'43), a wife was held not to he a dependent 
where there was an extended separation without con-
tribution by her husband. 
In considering the facts of the instant case against 
the background of applicable law, it is again noted that 
a decision of the Industrial ·Commission may not he dis-
turbed unless the court finds that the ~Commis·sion arbi-
trarily, and ·capTiciously disregarded the evidence or un-
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reasonably refused to believe competent, substantial, and 
m-aterial evidence. 
It is impossible to see in the case a scintilla of evi-
dence upon which any expectation of future support ·could 
be predicated. The parties had been separated for 11 
years at the time of death and during that entire p=eriod 
plaintiff had received only $200 or $225, and had received 
nothing wh!atsoever during the last five years of tha~ 
period. During at least the eight or nine years prior to 
death, deceased had been working at the same job for 
Clayton Investment Company in Salt Lake City, Utah 
('Tr. 29, 30). There was no concealment whatsoever. 
·The factor of past contribution, therefore, which 
as has been pointed out is one of the prime- factors in 
considering the question of dependency, is ·almost com-
pletely lacking. It is true that there is a legal duty 
existant, 'but as the court above has indicated, this. duty 
cannot itself create dependency. Moreover, that duty 
in this case is a narrow one since it is not the broad 
duty of a husband to support a wife, but th·at of a sep-
arate maintenance decree providing for the payment of 
only $2·5.00 per month. The cases cited above conside·r 
the dependency of husband and wife, but the p·arties in 
this case were not husband and wife since separate 
maintenance is a specie of divorce. 
'The actual need of the plaintiff is itself and in many 
respects a matter of conjecture. At p·age 7'6 of the 
transcript ap·pears the following: 
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"Q. Were you at the time of the death of 
Mr. Llewelyn dependent on him for your support 
and maintenance? 
''A. Well, yes, I was. Of ·course, I worked 
all the time steady.'' 
And at page 77: 
'' Q. During the past thirteen years have 
you at anytime lived with your husband~ 
"A. No. 
''Q. Have you been working during that 
timet 
''A. Yes, I worked off and on all the time.'' 
This last answer is interesting in that an attemp·t 
was made to show that plaintiff h·ad not worked for a 
few months prior to the date of death, yet this answer 
indicates that the employment during the- years of sep-
aration had been sporadic and carries the clear imp,lica-
tion that there were intervals when no work was per-
formed. Again, as the courts above have pointed out, 
need alone cannot form the basis of creating a dep·en-
dency. If that principle were established and dependency 
determined by the financial status of the alleged de-
pendent, in cases where a family had sufficient means 
to continue living in the proper station of life, they 
could not be classed as dependents even though de-
ceased had actually contributed regular and substantial 
amounts during his lifetime to their support. 'This is 
clearly not the law, and the courts have uniformly held 
to the contrary. 
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In conclusion, it is submitted that the Commission 
has given a fair and impartial consideration to all of 
the evidence before them, and has prop1erly decided that 
no -actual dependency existed. There is nothing in the 
record to indicate that the 'Commission arbitrarily and 
0ap-riciously disregarded or unreasonably refused to be-
lieve any of the evidence, and the. de·cision should be 
affirmed. 
The determination of the existence of a casual 
connection between the accidental injury and the 
death of deceased. 
At the outset of the brief, it was indicated that the 
defendant did not acquiesce in the finding that the injury 
sustained by the deceased was the actual cause of death, 
and the details of this p·rotest were set forth in the 
answer to the petition for rehearing '(Tr. 17). While 
we believe the finding must be sustained if there is com-
petent and material evidence in the record to support 
it, whether or not there is conflict in that evidence, we 
also believe an examination of the medical testimony 
discloses that ·all of the Ciompetent ·evidence is to the con-
trary. 
Statement of facts as to the causal connection 
between injury and death. 
Isaiah J. Llewelyn, age 62., was employed .bY the 
Clayton Investment Comp-any as a fireman at a heating 
plant of that company in S-alt Lake City, Utah on De-
cember 1, 19~6. CTr. 28). On that date he jumped off an 
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elevation about two feet high, and onto a ptiece of coal 
lying on the floor belo,v, injuring his left foot, which 
pained him on top of the instep and down the inside. 
(Tr. 32). He 'vas removed to his room in the Wilson 
Hotel, and Dr. J. J. Galligan was called (Tr. 82). H·e 
was removed the same date to the Holy Cross Hospital, 
where an examination of the lower leg showed a severe 
sprained ankle ~d incomplete fracture of the heel bone 
called the oscalcis, together with some stripping of the 
tips of the malleoli (Tr. 82). He remained in the hos-
pital until Janu·ary 27, 1947, and during this time was 
attended by Dr. Galligan who saw him nearly every 
day and sometimes twice a day (Tr. 82). Mrs. H. K. 
·Coolican saw him in the hospital on December 10, and 
stated that the foot was swollen and discolored nearly 
to the knee (Tr. 83), and that substantially the same 
condition prevailed on December 27 (Tr. '34). D·eceased 
was examined when he first went to the hospital, and 
at subsequent times, and in addition to the injury also 
had high blood pressure, an enlarged heart and a record 
of infection in his left leg one year prior to admission 
{'Tr. 84), and hypertension (Tr. 90). Upon admission 
he had an enlarged and swollen ankle joint and lower 
leg with tenderness over the heel {Tr. 84). 
Dr. Galligan treated the patient during the first hos-
pitalization, and did not see him more than once or twice 
thereafter ( Tr. 86). He testified that such a fracture 
is unusual (Tr. 88), and tha:t emboli (which immediately 
caused the death) usually occur immediately after the 
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InJury (Tr .. 89'). The p·eriod of hospitalization at that 
point was a normal period for injuries of that typ·e CT·r. 
9'1). 
About January 25, 1947, deceased. left the hospital 
and returned to the Wilson hotel (Tr·. 35), transferring 
to his daughter's home on F·ebruary 7, 1947 ('Tr. 36), 
where he remained until March 11, 1947 ('Tr. 106), on 
which date he returned to the hospital, and died there 
March 27, 19'47. His daughter testified that the leg was 
swollen and dis·colored on February 7, and on February 
9, pain traveled up his thigh (Tr. 38), moving into back 
on F·ebruary 22 (Tr. 39). While he went to bed on Feb-
ruary 7, he was up and around the house at intervals 
until February ·22 tTr. 48). 
Dr. Bruce R. Pearson first saw deceased on Febru-
ary 26, 1947 (Tr. 105) at the request of ·Dr. Galligan 
and was the attending physician from that date until 
time of death. His examination disclosed acute con-
gestive heart failure which was treated with digitalis, 
and when that was under control he found a severe in-
fection of the urinary tract ('Tr. 106). ;The heart con-
dition was unquestionably of many years standing and 
the urinary infection had existed for ~pproximately two 
or three years (Tr. 107}. The patient was aware of the 
symptoms of these diseases, but as a layman did not 
appreciate the specific nature of his illness tTr. 107). 
Dr. Pearson stated that the immediate cause of 
death was recurrent pulmonary embolism of about 1'6 
days duration ('Tr. 119) due to chronic vascular disease 
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(Tr. t19), and this was one of the causes put down on 
the death certificate by hin1 ('Tr. 111). There had been 
a major embolisn1 on ·March 15 and again on March 23 
(Tr. 11'5). Dr. Pearson testified that pulmonary emboli 
are most commonly caused by infection, disease, nutri-
tional causes and blood clotting (Tr. 112), and·also that 
one of the least causes is traumatic injury (Tr. 120). 
If the cause is traumatic, the importance of the time 
element was clearly set forth at page 120 of the tran-
script: 
'' Q. And if from some traumatic injury pul-
monary emboli is formed, how soon after the 
injury normally do these emboli reach the heart 
and cause death~ 
''A. ·The emboli-the vascular blood clot 
occurs immediately; that is, very mu·ch of a clot 
in an injured vessel occurs immediately following 
an injury, and if embolism is going to occur it 
will occur in most instances before the reparative 
process. That is scar tissue formation that takes 
place in the clots has had an opportunity to 
occur. That takes place quite rapidly, so that 
generally speaking from a traumatic injury we 
would expect any emboli phenom·ena to occur 
immediately. That is, within a period of a few 
days. Certainly within a period of three weeks 
ought to give anything that is going to occur, 
ample time to completely heal.'' 
And at page 122, 123 of the transcript: 
'' Q. Wh·en the emboli form, they hang on 
the inside of the vessel. They are not formed 
while moving, .are they' 
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''A. No, but once an embolus is formed and 
then there is ·an inflammatory process sets up 
within 24 to 48 hours. They just don't hang there 
and not do anything. 
'·' Q. They would not be moving through the 
vessels until they had broken away~ 
"'·A. 'That is right. According to our con-
Ce'pt of it, an embolus must break away and enter 
the circulatory system sometime within twenty-
four to forty-eight ·hours after it is first formed. 
Otherwise it will be fixed and permanent to the 
vein by this inflammatory re·action. 
'·' Q. You say it would he fixed and perma-
nent~ 
''A. Yes. 
'' Q. It could be formed in a permanent sta-
tus, and later on it might break loose~ 
''A. No, that is not the situation. When 
fibrous tissue sets in, the clot becom,es an integral 
part of the vein wall.'' 
D:r. Pearson testified ·as to -his opinion of the cause 
of death and its possible conneetion with the injury sus-
tained. At page 119 of the transcript he stated: 
'' Q. In your opinion was the injury to the 
left foot which was an incomplete fracture of the 
os ealcis and sprain of the left foot, was that, in 
your opinion, in any way the immediate caus-H of 
his death~ 
''A. I can't see any connection whatsoever. 
'' Q. In other words, the injury to the pa-
tient's left leg had no conneetion, direct or: other-
wise, to the immediate cause of death~ 
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'' ~~. In my opinion, definitely no.'' 
Again at page 108: 
''Q. Now, doctor, from your original exam-
ination and your subsequent treatment and your 
care and consideration of Mr. Llewelyn's case, 
did you form an op·inion as to what was the ·cause 
of death1 
''A. I did. 
'' Q. What was your opinion 1 
"A. I felt that the generalized cardio-vas-
cular renal disease was the p-rincipal cause of 
death, and that that was complicated by .a long 
history of chronic alcoholism, malnutrition and 
infection of the urinary tract.'' 
Dr. Pearson also qualified the testimony of the fam-
ily of deceased relative to the condition of the leg when 
deceased was taken to the hospital in March. He stated 
the leg was slightly trophic, without evidence of edema 
or swelling, and while stating there was discoloration, 
he deemed it to have come from old venous varicosities 
(Tr. 121). Also on February 27, there were pigmentary 
scars from ulcers on the shin, hut no other discoloration 
(Tt. 124). 
Dr. Leslie B. White was called as an expert witne·ss 
by plaintiff and the major portion of his testimony was 
directed to qualification, with the exception of a hypo-
thetical ·question and his answer CTr. 6"9}. He had never 
seen or treated the deceased ( Tr. 60). 
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ARGUMENT 
··.~ 
Based upon the medical testimony, there can be no 
doubt that the attending doctor, Pearson, was of the very 
definite and strong opinion that the injury did not cause 
or contribute to the death of deceased. The testimony 
of Dr. Galligan is not in conflict with this, particularly 
in view of the fact that he did not see the piatient, except 
once or twice at the home of the ·daughter, after the 
release from the hospital from the first period of hos-
pitalization on January 25, 1947. 
Dr. White, however, did indicate a causal connec-
tion between the injury and death. The focus of inquiry, 
therefore, must center on the only hypothetical question 
asked, and the answer of Dr. White. The question and 
answer follow ('Tr. '69) : 
'' Q. Doctor, I will ask you to assume the 
following facts to be true: :That on the 1st of 
December, 194·6, Mr. Llewelyn, a man of •62 years 
was in good health and he stumbled and fell and 
fractured the plantar aspect of the os calcis of 
the left foot. That Mr. Llewelyn was confined to 
his bed in a hospital from D·ecember 1, 1946 to 
January 25, 1947, and on this later date he was 
released from the hospital improved but still suf-
fering extremely from a sore, swollen and very 
discolored left leg and foot. That Mr. Llewelyn 
could not stand with his foot lowered 'because 
of the extreme pain, and that he was unable to 
hear any weight on his leg and could only move 
about with the aid of crutches. That Mr. Llewelyn 
suffered no other injury, but on February 7, 1947, 
he was stricken with a pain in the calf of his 
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left leg; that this pain seemed to progress UJli the 
left leg into the thigh and from the thigh into 
the side, and finally lodging in his hack on Feb-
ruary 22, 1947; that after this later date Mr. 
Llewelyn was unable to get out of bed; that on or 
about March 14 the first of a series of emboli 
passed through Mr. Llewelyn's pulmonary veins 
and on March 21 Mr. Llewelyn died, and the diag-
nosis was recurrent pulmonary embolism of six-
teen days duration. Now Doctor, based on your 
experience as a physician and surgeon, do you 
have an opinion as to the source and ·cause of 
the emboli th-at was the immediate cause of Mr. 
Llewelyn's death? ' ' 
(Discussion by Counsel) 
'' Q. Answer whether you have an opinion 
based on your experience. 
''A. Yes. 
'' Q. What is your opinion, doctor' 
''A. My opinion is that-from the hypo-
thetical question quoted- that there had been 
some damage to the vessels to the foot or calf of 
the leg which formed a thrombosis in the great 
vessels of the leg, either the popliteal or femoral 
vein. 'The clot would not necessarily block the 
entire vein, but it lodged there free, and after 
a given length of time it was jarred loose and 
went into the general circulation and carried up 
through the heart to the lung, and that the pul-
monary embolus was the immediate cause of 
death. ·There may have been other factors, I don't 
know." 
It will be noted that the answer itself is very care-
ful to limit itself to the hypothetical question, for the 
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Doctor says ''from the hypothetical question quoted'' 
and also ''' 1There may have been other factors, I don't 
know." The difficulty with the hyp:othetical question, 
however, is that it omits entirely the very factors which 
Dr. Pearson had listed as the cause of death. Dr. Pear-
son had testified that emboli are caused by a number of 
conditions, listing disease as. the most frequent cause 
and traumatic injury as the most infrequent. All of the 
medical testimony indicates, howe:ver, that emboU are 
created by a specific cause, and apparently are not cre-
ated by the body without that cause. The pToblem con-
fronting Dr. White in the question was that of a man in 
'' g~olo~d he1a~th,'' who sustained an injury which produced 
symptoms of pain and discolor, and who died from an 
emboli. Under the question there was only one possible 
source for the emboli, and that was the injury. Nothing 
else was p·resent which could have caused it. Dr. White 
does not in final analysis contradict the testimony of Dr. 
P·earson that an emboli usually occurs, when caused by 
injury, immediately thereafter and not to exceed three 
weeks. The testimony of Dr. White may well have viewed 
the injury as possibly causing death simply because the 
immediate cause of death was known and there was no 
other conceivable source for the immediate cause ex-
ce·pt that injury. Had the Doctor been properly advised 
and the question adequately framed to show that de-
ceased was suffering from generalized cardio-vascular 
renal disease, complicated by a long history of chronic 
alcoholism, malnutrition and infection of the urinary 
tract, his answer might well have been identical with 
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that of Dr. Pearson. For these reason;s it is, submitted 
that there is in reality no competent contradiction of 
Dr. Pearson, and therefore no testimony upon which 
the finding of the Commission that the injury caused the 
death could be predicated. 
In conclusion it is submitted that the decision of 
the Commission denying compensation should be affirm-
ed, not only upon the ground that there was no depen-
dency in this case, but upon the further ground th·at 
there was no casual connection between the injury and 
the death. 
E~L GROTH and ROB·E·RT SP10i0,NER, 
SKEEN, 'THORMAN and WORSL.EY, 
Attorneys for DefendJwnts 
·Clayton Investment Comp·any and United 
·states Fidelity and Guaranty 'Company 
GROVER A. GHJE:s., 
Attorrney aenenal of Utah 
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